Did He Really Say That?

You know, my expectations for President Bush’s historical literacy are not high. But his comments in Riga, Latvia on Saturday at the commemoration of the anniversary of the 60th anniversary of the Allied victory over Hitler managed to fail to clear even my abysmally low bar.

As we mark a victory of six days ago — six decades ago, we are mindful of a paradox. For much of Germany, defeat led to freedom. For much of Eastern and Central Europe, victory brought the iron rule of another empire. V-E Day marked the end of fascism, but it did not end oppression. The agreement at Yalta followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Once again, when powerful governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable. Yet this attempt to sacrifice freedom for the sake of stability left a continent divided and unstable. The captivity of millions in Central and Eastern Europe will be remembered as one of the greatest wrongs of history.

(Emphasis mine)

OK. First, the one thing he actually managed to get right: it was a colossal tragedy that the nations of Eastern Europe had to exchange one dictator for another at the end of the war. Seriously. After so many years of war and oppression, they deserved their freedom as much as the people of the West did.

However. Bush compares the Yalta conference, at which the victorious Allies set up the framework for postwar Europe, to be morally equivalent to such odious doings as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was the 1939 agreement between Nazi Germany and the USSR to jointly invade and divide up Poland.

Now, I see why Bush might get a bit of a kick talking this way — it fits his usual, generic “democracy is job 1” rhetoric. But it’s more than a little offensive. Yalta was not an agreement to make something happen that was not already in place, like Molotov-Ribbentrop was — it was a simple recognition of the facts on the ground. In 1945 the Red Army was in control of Eastern Europe, and Stalin wasn’t going to order them out anytime soon. Churchill and Roosevelt could protest, but they had little leverage. Stalin already had what he wanted. Yalta was a recognition of this, not the cause of it.

Bush’s words go beyond historical illiteracy into offensiveness because they imply that Britain and America should have done something about this state of affairs. What would Bush have had us do? Declare war on the USSR and try to push them out of Eastern Europe altogether? Fat chance — the Red Army dwarfed the other Allied forces, Britain had already been bankrupted by fighting the Nazis, and America was weary of war and ready for peace. There are some mountains you just can’t climb; Churchill and Roosevelt had the wit to recognize that, even if Bush does not.

And it’s not like they left Yalta empty-handed. At Yalta, Churchill and FDR got Stalin to at least agree to hold fair elections in his territories — even if they knew he would never act on this promise, just by getting him to make the agreement, they were maneuvering him from the position of World War ally into the Cold War enemy, seizing the moral high ground for the West in the rift that they must have known was coming.

Oddly, after excoriating the heroic leaders of the WW2 generation for not being macho enough to stick up for democracy (!), Bush seems to change his mind in the next breath:

The end of World War II raised unavoidable questions for my country: Had we fought and sacrificed only to achieve the permanent division of Europe into armed camps? Or did the cause of freedom and the rights of nations require more of us? Eventually, America and our strong allies made a decision: We would not be content with the liberation of half of Europe — and we would not forget our friends behind an Iron Curtain. We defended the freedom of Greece and Turkey, and airlifted supplies to Berlin, and broadcast the message of liberty by radio. We spoke up for dissenters, and challenged an empire to tear down a hated wall. Eventually, communism began to collapse under external pressure, and under the weight of its own contradictions. And we set the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace — so dictators could no longer rise up and feed ancient grievances, and conflict would not be repeated again and again.

That’s all substantially true — but if we had walked away from Yalta and resolved to free the East by force, none of it would be. Instead the history of the second half of the twentieth century would be a story of even more global war, fought across the world, with millions of casualties and Europe’s recovery delayed by decades — and, almost certainly at some point, some level of atomic war between the combatants, with all the consequences that implies.

The people of the world were spared all that because of the decisions Churchill and Roosevelt made at Yalta, and in the immediate postwar months that followed. The outcome of the war wasn’t perfect; but given the reality of the USSR and Stalin, it’s easy to see how it could have been a lot worse. President Bush should think about that before he boils every leadership decision down to Democracy™ vs. Dictatorship™.


Comments

Sandy Smith

May 11, 2005
2:33 am

I started to respond, but just read this post:
http://www.reason.com/hitandrun/2005/05/when_men_were_m.shtml

Jason Lefkowitz

May 11, 2005
7:17 am

The quotes Reason pulls together don’t say the same thing that Bush did. Look at them carefully.
Talbott: “[Yalta] is a place name that has come to be a *codeword* for the cynical sacrifice of small nations…”
Clinton: “At one time, the city of Yalta went down in history as a *symbol* of the division of Europe.”
They’re speaking not about the actual Yalta agreement, but about the thicket of resentment that grew up in the East after the Iron Curtain came down. For the nations oppressed by Stalin, “Yalta” was a convenient shorthand for their plight.
What Bush said was qualitatively different:
“The agreement at Yalta followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact… Yet this attempt to sacrifice freedom for the sake of stability left a continent divided and unstable.”
He’s not talking about people’s _perceptions_ of Yalta. He’s talking about the substance of the agreement itself — and equating it with totalitarian countries cynically dividing up their neighbors (cf. Molotov-Ribbentrop).
Since that’s the case I think my challenge stands — please explain what alternative course of action would have been preferable in 1945. Should we have struck a separate peace with the Germans and joined their war against the USSR? Should we have threatened the Soviets with the atom bomb unless they withdrew to their 1941 borders? (Or their 1939 borders?) Would either of these courses have resulted in a better world than the one we have now?

Joe

May 11, 2005
1:36 pm

There is a difference between Molotov-Ribbentrop and Yalta. The Nazis where a hell of lot more honest than Roosevelt. Hitler gets a secure flank on the East and Stalin gets half of Poland, the Baltics, and a free hand in Finland.
What did the FDR get at Yalta? They agree to allow the Soviets to lock out every pro-western group (such as the Free Poles in London), in exchange for a toothless promise that there will be elections in Soviet occupied Europe. Then Stalin gets to claim that each nation in Eastern Europe has chosen “people’s parties” after they’ve been liberated by the Red Army. Oh, and they Soviets finally agree to join in the war against Japan, allowing them to role through Asia while we continue to slug it out with the Japanese Mainland. In short, we agreed to Soviet lies and gained nothing in return.
So what else could we have done? Going to war against the Russians, or making a seperate peace with the Nazis would be impossible. And W never did suggest this. But giving a blank check to Stalin was not the only opiton. The one thing Stalin wanted more than anything was to tak Berlin, Which U.S. forces could have seized before the Soviets if it was made a priority. Roosevelt, instead of trusting his war buddy Uncle Joe, could have at least demanded that the Free Polish government be returned to Poland, along with armed Free Polish Troops, and American Troops be allowed to fully occupy Czechoslovakia, in exchange for a Russian Free hand in Berlin. This would have given both countries greater ability to resist Soviet Imperialism, and have dented the ability of the Red Army to draw its Iron Curtain across all of Eastern Europe. Even if Stalin tried to betray that promise, it would at least be better than trading millions of people from once tyrant to another with a wink and a nudge.
I think Bush was right to bring this up the way he did. Putin has been using this anniversery to glorify not the Russian People in their fight against Hitler, but the Soviet Union and Stalin. The same thugs who worked with Hitler for years, and were so consumed with purges they left their nation exposed to the Nazi war machine. The same thugs who used the war to solidfy their own police state while sacraficing millions in a “great patriotic war.” If Putin won’t admit that the government of the Soviet Union used the war in Europe to enslave half of Europe, then I’m glad Bush did.

Sandy Smith

May 11, 2005
11:37 pm

“please explain what alternative course of action would have been preferable in 1945”
Was your alternative to invading Iraq to give Saddam a few nukes and say, “You be good now,”? I didn’t think so. Is it on you to say how to solve the Iraq problem just because invasion is a lame idea, or can you criticize it as a bad idea and that almost anything short of it is a good idea?
Again, a better response:
http://www.reason.com/hitandrun/2005/05/yalta_once_more.shtml
You quote his line and leave out a bit. Here’s the sentence right after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact:
“Once again, when powerful governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable.”
Remember, Yalta GAVE AWAY the Baltics which had been won by Wilson–and caused them to cease to exist. Yalta GAVE AWAY several countries in Central Europe WITHOUT A SINGLE REPRESENTATIVE THERE TO SPEAK FOR THEIR PEOPLE.
Yalta, quite frankly, was a crime.
As to what we could do differently? How about this:
Anything short of bending over spreading our cheeks, looking back over our shoulder and saying around our affected cigarette holder, “That’s OK, my boy, lubrication isn’t necessary.” That would be nice. A word of protest, a suggestion that it’s wrong. Something. Anything.
The opposite of war is not capitulation.

Jason Lefkowitz

May 12, 2005
7:53 am

“Was your alternative to invading Iraq to give Saddam a few nukes and say, “You be good now,”? I didn’t think so. Is it on you to say how to solve the Iraq problem just because invasion is a lame idea, or can you criticize it as a bad idea and that almost anything short of it is a good idea?”
Wha? WTF does the one have to do with the other?
Yalta, for all its consequences — and please note that I am quite aware of the terrible consequences it had — was at root a codification of the status quo on the ground.
The proper analogy to Iraq would be if we had continued the status quo there as well — i.e. containment.
In both cases the burden of arguing for change is on the people who would shift to a new policy — who would move away from the status quo.
“Remember, Yalta GAVE AWAY the Baltics which had been won by Wilson–and caused them to cease to exist. Yalta GAVE AWAY several countries in Central Europe WITHOUT A SINGLE REPRESENTATIVE THERE TO SPEAK FOR THEIR PEOPLE.”
By the time of Yalta those countries had already been overrun by the Red Army. If there had been a Lithuanian there to ask nicely, would Uncle Joe have packed up and gone home?
“Anything short of bending over spreading our cheeks, looking back over our shoulder and saying around our affected cigarette holder, “That’s OK, my boy, lubrication isn’t necessary.” That would be nice. A word of protest, a suggestion that it’s wrong. Something. Anything.”
So some fluffy words would have kept the people of the Baltic republics warm at night through 50 years of Stalinist oppression? Or would they just have soothed our aching conscience without actually accomplishing anything?
That was my point in the original post: we didn’t exactly have a strong bargaining position at Yalta. The Russians were in Eastern Europe, their army was an order of magnitude bigger than all the other Allied forces put together. We could try to arm-wrestle them, but we risked provoking war, which none of the Western nations were ready for. Or we could brandish the bomb (and in fact one line of thought is that Truman dropped 2 bombs rather than one to impress the Russians, not the Japanese).
Joe, you make an interesting suggestion, but it overlooks an important point — the Russians got to Berlin long before we could. We could have tried to impose conditions on their occupation, of course; and then they could have just have easily told us to kiss their ass, turned the entire city into the Russian Sector, and kicked all the Westerners out. And then we’d have had to decide whether or not to fight our way back in…